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I. Introduction 
Lending to interested or related parties of a bank is generally restricted or regulated. Related 
lending to insiders and affiliated companies increases bank risk; however, banks are inclined to 
provide credit to related parties. After Asia’s currency crisis, it was confirmed that related lending 
existed in many countries and ownership structures in Asian counties which aggravated the crisis 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [1998]).  
There are two views of the reason for related lending: the information view and the looting 
view (La Porta et al. [2003]). The information view sees related lending has a function to alleviate 
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the problems of asymmetric information; the looting view sees it as a transfer of profits from 
depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. Tunneling is one of the examples set forth by 
advocates of this view. Which view finds support in practice depends on the results of empirical 
studies. Several studies examined the practice of crony and relation lending in Thailand and Korea in 
1990s. This article examines related lending by Indonesian banks. 
The Asian currency crisis in 1997 severely affected the Indonesian economy. It led in May of 
the following year to the collapse of the Soeharto government which had stood for 32 years. There 
were runs even on the biggest private banks as many depositors sought to withdraw their money, and 
the Indonesian rupiah dropped to less than one seventh of its pre-crisis value. These successive 
events devastated the Indonesian economy especially the banking sector. 
Before the crisis related lending prevailed. Banks generally breached the legal lending limit by 
channeling more than the allowed 20 percent credit to affiliated parties (Jakarta Post, September 11, 
1998), and capitalized banks especially had lent between 70 percent and 90 percent of their equity 
capital to affiliated parties (Jakarta Post, September 29, 1998). The extraordinary amount of related 
lending caused the central bank (Bank Indonesia) to introduce regulations distinguishing “related 
party” borrowers from “third party” one. Thereafter banks were obligated to report the total amount 
of lending and funding for related parties carried on their balance sheets. 
Third party funds comprise a large portion of bank assets and liabilities; however, a certain 
level of credit is continuously disbursed to related parties. The percentage of related parties 
fluctuates depending on banks and economic situations. This article will examine whether related 
lending affects the risk and performance of banks. 
Since the financial crisis, the Indonesian banking system has been changed and improved 
through bank restructuring. Before the crisis the Indonesian banking sector was characterized by 
problems common to developing economies. State owned banks dominated the markets and served 
as conduits to channel state funds to subsidized sectors, while major private banks poured funds into 
their group companies. The government often intervened in financial policy and supervisory 
authority did not function well. During the Soeharto era, the government’s stance was not to close 
any banks, and lax bank management was pervasive. After the crisis institutional reform was carried 
out, and prudential regulation was reviewed and reintroduced in the proper way. This article will 
examine how banking sector restructuring policies have affected banking behavior toward related 
lending.  
The next section reviews studies on related lending and tunneling, and bank performance. 
Section III gives a short overview of the Indonesian banking sector. This is followed by an 
explanation of the data set and methodology in section IV, and the results of the regression analysis 
in section V.  Section VI contains a summary of the article and its conclusions. 
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II. Preceding studies on related lending and bank performance 
 
There are few studies addressing related lending issues directly, La Porta et al. (2003) examine 
the benefits of related lending in Mexico. They found that related lending was a large fraction of the 
banking business (20 percent of commercial loans) and the fraction of related lending almost double 
for the banks that subsequently went bankrupt. Furthermore related lending received better terms 
than unrelated ones. The probability of default of related lending was much higher. These findings 
are consistent with the looting view and related lending can be considered as a potential source of 
bank fragility. 
Tunneling relates to the looting view. Johnson et al. (2000) defined “tunneling” as the transfer 
of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit for those who control them. They examined whether 
tunneling occur in emerging markets where law enforcement is poor or also happen in developed 
countries. They found that tunneling also occurs in developed country and legally. At any rate weak 
law system may relate to tunneling. Bae et al.(2002) study existence of tunneling examining whether 
firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols) benefit from acquisitions. They found some 
evidences consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. 
Many evidences indicate that a firm’s business transaction with their related parties benefit 
control shareholder of the firm, however, it still seems meaningful to examine related business 
transaction from the information view because it may compensate for insufficient system in 
developing countries (Khanna and Palepu [1999, 2000]).  
This article analyze effects of related lending on bank performance, profitability and risk 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) examined determinants of interest margin and bank 
profitability using the cross-country data of 80 countries covering both developed and developing 
countries. They showed that a bigger banking sector and low concentration ratio bring lower bank 
profitability and margin, while foreign banks make higher profits in developing counties but lower 
ones in developed counties. Molyneux and Thornton (1992) examined the determinants of bank 
performances across eighteen European countries between 1986 and 1989 using concentration of top 
ten banks. 
How to measure bank risk is not simple. Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2008) analyses 
the determinants of risk-taking in Spanish financial intermediaries and two different measures: 
Z-score and solvency margin are examined as proxy of risk. Konoshi and Yasuda (2004) examined 
the determinants of risk taking measured by Z-score at Japanese commercial banks. Gonzalez (2005) 
analyzes the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk-taking using a panel database 
of 251 banks in 36 countries. Two different measures of bank risk are used: credit risk and overall 
bank risk. Credit risk is measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total bank loans and other 
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types of bank risk, such as market and operations risk, the standard deviation of daily bank stock 
returns for each year is also applied as a measure of overall risk. 
 
 
III. Indonesian Financial Sector 
 
a. Overview 
The Indonesian financial sector has been dominated by banking (Hamada 2003). In the 1970s 
state-owned banks dominated the banking sector which channeled the abundant public funds brought 
in by the soaring oil prices to government subsidized sectors. During the 1980s the fall in oil prices 
reduced government revenues and worsened the economy. The Indonesian government implemented 
two sets of comprehensive and radical banking reforms in 1983 and 1988 as part of its structural 
adjustment policy.  
Indonesia’s banking sector expanded rapidly due to the reforms. The number of commercial 
bank increased rapidly from 115 in 1983 to 240 in 1995, the increase attributed to the growth in the 
number of private commercial banks. In 1995 these banks took over the dominant position from 
state-owned banks.  
This rapid expansion was supported by massive capital inflows in the 1990s, and the rapid 
quantitative expansion easily induced sloppy bank management under the country’s development 
dictatorship. The expansion continued until the crisis in 1997. In the 1970s, preceding the banking 
reforms in the 1980s, Indonesia had completed liberalization of its capital account. Having opened 
its capital account very early in the process of financial liberalization, Indonesia’s financial sector 
experienced much more serious and acute financial problems in the wake of the crisis than did other 
countries such as Thailand and Korea.  
After the Asian currency crisis, the government closed sixteen private national banks in 
November 1997 in compliance with the conditionality of IMF. The closures were executed without a 
safety net for depositors which created complete turmoil in the Indonesian banking sector. This was 
followed by the political turbulence of 1998 which led to the collapse of the rupiah. This deep 
devaluation hit the performance of many companies holding huge debts in US dollars, and the rate of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) leaped. In March 1999 the average non-performing loan rate of all 
commercial banks jumped to 59%. Huge NPLs and swelling debts in foreign currency deteriorated 
bank balance sheets and for almost all banks debts exceeded assets. Ailing but important banks were 
re-capitalized by the government, and their irrecoverable loans were transferred to the Asset 
Management Unit of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). A total of 430.4 trillion 
rupiah, which was equivalent to 60% of GDP, was injected into the banking sector. Sixty-eight banks 
were closed, thirteen were nationalized, twenty-seven were re-capitalized, four state-owned banks 
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were merged into one new state-owned bank, and several major private banks were merged. A set of 
restructuring policies decreased the total number of banks to 164 in 2000. 
Restructuring measures were implemented by 2000 however, the banking sector continued to 
struggle in the aftermath of the crisis. In 2002 bank credit resumed expansion.  
 
b. Institutional Reform 
After the financial crisis, the government and Bank Indonesia formulated or amended several 
laws of the banking system and introduced prudential regulations. In May 1999 the central banking 
law was amended. It secured the independence of Bank Indonesia. Henceforth the bank was no 
longer required to supply direct credit to such sectors as agriculture, housing and small and medium 
enterprisesi. Thus Bank Indonesia’s function was redirected to maintaining the stability of exchange 
rates and devising monetary policy from fiscal distribution.  
In January 2005 Bank Indonesia enacted a regulation of legal lending limits (LLL). Following 
the 1997 crisis, group lending or related lending became a serious issue. In the banking reform of 
1988, Bank Indonesia had already stipulated limits on lending: 20% of the capital of a bank or 
financial institution could be lent to a debtor, and 50% of capital could be to a debtors’ group. And 
there was a lending limit of 10% of capital to the stakeholders of a bank or non-bank institution, 
25% to a stakeholder’s corporate group, 5% to auditors-not-stakeholders and to corporations owned 
by auditors. In addition, there were limitations on lending to board members, auditors and families of 
stakeholders (Central Bank Directors Determination, No21/50, 1988).  The crisis revealed that the 
LLL regulation was not being observed, so in 2005 new regulation was introduced to strengthen the 
legal lending limits. A related party is now defined as any natural person or company/entity 
exercising control over the bank, whether directly or indirectly, through ownership, management, 
and/or financial links. The prescribed maximum limit of the entire portfolio of provision of funds to 
related parties is to be no more than 10% of a bank capital. A number of prohibited matters 
concerning related parties was also introducedii, and along with these prudential regulations, Bank 
Indonesia also strengthened the capacity of supervision and financial due diligence to create a robust 
banking system. 
  
 
IV. Methodology 
 
What impact does related lending have on bank performance in Indonesia? Does related 
lending in Indonesia support the information view or looting view? It is assumed in this article that 
the weak institutional system under the Soeharto regime before the crisis might have enhanced the 
lax management of banks. At the same time, related lending might compensate for the lack of 
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information on borrowers under Indonesia’s weak information disclosure system. If related lending 
had some function in managing informational problems in the premature banking system, the 
function has likely changed in line with the banking sector’s restructuring. In this section two issues 
will be examined: the effects of related lending on bank performance and the changed of the effects 
over time. 
 
a. Data and variables 
 
As of June 2008, 123 banks were operating in Indonesia’s banking sector. They are divided 
into five types: state-owned banks, regional government banks, private banks (foreign exchange 
(forex) banks and non-foreign exchange (non-forex) banks) joint banks, and foreign banks. The data 
set is panel data comprised of a total of 74 banks (four state-owned banks and 32 private forex banks, 
and 32 private non-forex banks) using annual financial data from 1994 to 2007. During the 
observation period Indonesia experienced several crucial events such as the Asian currency crisis, 
the fall of the Soeharto regime and its subsequent social and economic turmoil, and the drastic 
economic reform that followed thereafter. In order to measure and compare the changes, the 
observation period is divided into four sub-periods: 1994 to 1997 (period I), 1998 to 2000 (period II), 
and 2001 to 2003 (period III), and 2004 to 2007(period IV). The first period can be characterized as 
one of lax management under the old banking system before the crisis. The second period was one of 
turmoil due to the Asian currency crisis and economic dislocation in Indonesia which played havoc 
with the banking sector. During the third period the country stated to get back on the track to 
recovery. Bank restructuring policies took effect; banks resumed lending. During the fourth period 
the banking sector returned to a new normal situation under sector restructuring policy and an 
ordered banking system.  
First the effects of related lending on profits will be examined regarding return on assets 
(ROA) and net interest margin (NIM)iii; then the effects on bank risk will be analyzed. Since few 
Indonesian banks are listed on the Indonesian stock market, stock prices are not available for this 
study. Thus the Z-score calculated based on financial data and non-performing loan rate are 
examined as a risk indicators.  
 Dependent variables are the following: 
 
Bank definitions 
 Related lending variables: 
Related: total amount of related lending divided by total lending 
LLL _med : 1 if related lending ratio is more than median ratio; otherwise 0 
LLL _ave: 1 if related lending ratio is more than average ratio; otherwise 0 
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Equity: Ratio of equity capital divided by total assts  
BOPO: Ratio of operational expense by divided operational income 
Lnasset: Natural logarithm of total assets 
 Credit: ratio of total amount of credit divided by total assets 
Macroeconomic indicators 
GDP_g: Annual growth rate of real GDP 
Exchg: Changes in exchange rate 
 
b. Bank Profitability 
ROAit=β0 +β1Equityit +β2BOPOit +β3Lnassetit +β4 Creditit+β5 Relatedit +ɛit  (1) 
NIMit=β0 +β1Equityit +β2BOPOit +β3Lnassetit +β4 Creditit+β5 Relatedit +ɛit  (2) 
 
Equation (1), (2) use three related lending variables: Related (related lending ratio), dummy 
variables (LLL_med, LLL_ave). LLL_medit shows whether the related lending ratio of Bank i is 
larger than the median of all banks in each sub-period. If it is larger than the median, LLL_medit is 1; 
if less than the median, it is 0. LLL_aveit uses an average of related lending ratio instead of the 
median ratio.  
Figure 1 shows the changes in the related lending ratio from December 1994 to June 2008. The 
median ratio and average ratio respectively in each observation period are: 0.017 and 0.051 in the 
first period, 0.011 and 0.048 in the second period, and 0.007 and 0.029 in the third period, and 0.008 
and 0.027 in the fourth period; the median of the ratio is continuously reduced while the average of 
the ratio fluctuates, and the average ratios exceed the median ratios in all periods. Both of them are 
declining, but it is clear that related lending jumped in the second period. Figure 2 shows changes in 
the variables from 1994 to 2007 and presents how severe the crisis affected the Indonesian banking 
sector, for example ROA dropped to -15% in 1998. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of 
variables. 
 
 
c. Bank Risk 
 
Bank risk is measured by the Z-score which is calculated as the following equation.  
      
 
Sr is the standard deviation of ROA.  A Z-score is calculated in each observation period. Equation 
(3) measures the effects of related lending on level of bank risk. In this estimation the explanatory 
rS
AssetEquityROA
Z
∑∑ +
=
/
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variables are the average of each explanatory variable in the observation period.  
 
Z-scoreit?  =? β0 +β1Equityit +β2BOPOit +β3NIMit +β4 Creditit+β5 Exchanget   
+β6 GDP-gt +β7 Relatedit +ɛ                  (3) 
 
The non-performing loan ratio (NPL) is one of the major indicators of bank risk. Indonesia 
began disclosing NPL information publicly since 1998.  
 
NPLit?  =? β0 +β1Equityit + +β2Lnassetit +β3Creditit+β4Exchanget  +β5 GDP-gt +β6Relatedit +ɛ      
                                                (4) 
 
 
V. Results 
 
a. Profitability 
i)ROA 
This section evaluates whether related lending has effects on return on assets (ROA). ROA is a 
comprehensive indicator of profitability. The estimations of equations (1) are showed in Table 2. In 
the first period, the regression results indicate that the coefficient of related lending (LLL_ave) is 
positive (coefficient =0.006) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The equity ratio is positive 
and significant at the 10% level. Several studies confirmed that higher equity ratio contributes to 
higher ROA, the result here supports this position. The operational expense ratio (BOPO) is positive 
and significant, and total asset is negative but insignificant and credit ratio is negative and significant 
at the 5% level.  The fact that the determination coefficients (overall R2) of all the equations in the 
first period are less than 0.05 implies that these explanatory variables cannot explain the changes in 
ROA accurately. 
In the second period, the estimation of equation (1) shows that related lending has negative 
effects on profitability. The coefficient of related lending ratio is -0.128 and significant at the 10% 
level. The results of using the related lending dummy are negative but insignificant. Other 
explanatory variables exhibit the same results in all models. The equity ratio and total assets are 
positive and significant, and the BOPO and credit ratio are negative and significant. The 
determination coefficient has improved to 0.58.  
In the third period, related lending turns to having positive effects on profitability. The 
coefficients of related lending are positive and significant at the 5% level, except related lending 
dummy (LLL_med). The other variables exhibit the same results. The equity ratio is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, and total assets are positive but insignificant. The BOPO and credit ratio 
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are negative and significant. The determination coefficient is around 0.5. In the fourth period related 
lending (LLL_ave) turns to having negative effects on profitability. The equity ratio is positive and 
significant at the 1%, BOPO and credit ratio are negative and significant at the 1% level. The 
determination coefficient has increased to 0.9. 
 
ii)NIM 
This section examines the effects of related lending on net interest margin (NIM). NIM is an 
indication of the profitability and efficiency of a bank's investments. The estimations of equations (2) 
are showed in Table 3. Only in the second period, the related lending has effects on NIM.  
In the first period the equity ratio is not significant. The BOPO and total assets are negative 
and significant at the 1% level. In the second period, the related lending ratio is negative and 
significant at the 5% level (except related lending dummy, LLL_med). The equity ratio and the 
BOPO are positive and significant at the 1% level. The total asset is negative and significant. The 
results that a higher equity ratio leads to higher NIM, and higher expense (BOPO) decreases NIM 
are reasonable. The third and fourth periods the related lending ratios are all insignificant. In third 
period the equity ratio and the credit ratio are positive and significant at the 1% level, and the BOPO 
is negative and significant at the 5% level. In the fourth period the effects of equity ratio turn into 
insignificant. The BOPO and total assets are negative and significant and credit ratio is positive and 
significant.  
 
iii) Effects on bank profitability 
During the crisis the related lending ratio jumped, and until the end of 2001 the ratio remained 
high. It is apparent that banks increase lending to related parties during the period of economical 
difficulties. Charumilind, Kali and Wiwattanakantang (2006) found that the presence of close ties of 
Thai firms with banks and politicians was associated with preferential access to long-term debt prior 
to the Asian Crisis of 1997–98. Chiu and Joh (2004) examined Korean bank loans to distressed firms 
and showed that crony lending, related lending and poor bank governance likely facilitated increased 
bank loans to failing firms. The evidence of these other Asian countries may be applicable to 
Indonesia too.  
During Indonesia’s economic difficulties (period II) banks tended to increase lending to 
related parties and the related lending decreases bank profits. This was a kind of profit transfer from 
banks to related parties, which is the nature of tunneling. The regression results also support this 
view. Table 2 and 3 indicate that a higher related lending ratio affected bank profitability negatively, 
and this was especially clear in the second period. Thus the looting view is supported in Indonesia 
during the economic difficulties. 
However, results also show the opposite evidence that a higher credit allocation to the related 
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parties increased ROA before and after the crisis (period I and III). In this article it is assumed that 
the Indonesian banking system had the weak institutional and information disclosure system before 
the crisis. The fact that higher related lending ratio more than the average has positive effect on ROA 
(period I) supports the information view which compensates for the lack of information on 
borrowers.  In period III effects of related lending is positive. In this period the Indonesian 
economy had begun to slowly recover. The annual growth rate of real GDP in 2001 was 3.8% and it 
had continuously increased. Banks started to expand credit since 2002. The growth rate of bank 
credit in 2002 was 16% on an average of all banks, however, the expansion of credit owed middle 
size private banks because state owned banks and major large private banks were still under 
restructuring. In addition large companies were closely linked to the bank restructuring and their 
assets were managed by Asset Management Unit or IBRA. Thus large banks and companies were 
stuck in restructuring and the main borrowers shifted from large companies to non-large companies 
and individuals.  
Figure 3 and 4 show the average of related lending ratio and credit ratio of each period by 
bank types: state owned bank, private forex bank, and private non-forex bank. Private non-forex 
bank is much smaller than private forex bank and state owned bank. Private forex bank reduced 
largely related lending in the period III. It was mainly attributed to restriction of credit disbursement 
to restructuring companies. Private non-forex banks also reduced related lending but increased credit 
in the period III. The percentage of total assets of private non-forex banks is small around 2% of all 
banks. Their information production capacity is smaller than large banks and they are inclined to rely 
on related lending to alleviate problems of information asymmetry. Therefore the results that 
increase in related lending has positive effects on bank profitability; it reflects the economic 
environment of the third period. 
In the fourth period the effects return to negative as the Indonesian economy became has 
normalized. It can be said that if the banking system is improved and economy is back to normal, 
role of related lending to compensate for insufficient institutional system may be terminated.  
NIM is the difference between interest income and expense of interest, thus credit ratio is 
assumed to affect NIM directory. Seeing the coefficients of credit ratio, the results in period I and II 
are insignificant, but afterwards turned to positive and significant in period III and IV.  Higher 
credit ratio indicates that a bank is carrying out the original function of financial intermediation. 
Thus the result that a higher credit ratio contribute to increase profitability is a reasonable one for the 
banking business. And it implies that the Indonesian banking sector increasingly functions well and 
profit structure is improved.  
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b. Bank risk 
 
i)Z-score 
The Z-score indicates the probability of bankruptcy. A lower Z-score implies a higher 
probability of bankruptcy. The estimation of equation (3) is showed in Table 4. The coefficient of 
related lending is insignificant. The equity ratio and credit ratio is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. As the equity ratio is an indicator of soundness, it is reasonable that a higher equity ratio 
decreases the risk of bankruptcy.  
The BOPO is negative and significant at the 1% level; it implies a higher expense increase 
risk. Concerning net interest margin, the coefficient of NIM is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Higher profitability is not necessarily an indicator of low risk. In equation (3) the annual 
growth rate of real GDP is added so that the estimation reflects the effects of the different time points 
of the panel data. The coefficient of the GDP growth rate is positive and significant. 
 
ii) Non performing loans 
In 1999, the average rate of non-performing loans for commercial banks jumped to 59%, 
and that for private foreign banks soared to 77%. Table 5 shows the regression results of equation 
(4); the coefficient of related lending is positive but insignificant except the fourth period in which 
coefficient of the dummy variable (LLL_med) of related lending is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. The total assets has negative effects on NPL in the fourth period, however, the coefficient of 
determination of all models are less than 0.01. The upper table in Table 5 which examines the pooled 
data of entire period, the coefficients of exchange rate is positive and significant at the 5% level and 
growth rate of GDP is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
iii) Effects on bank risk 
The examination of related lending effects on Z-score shows that it has not any effects on 
bankruptcy risk.  Concerning effects on NPLs the effects of related lending are not clear. A low 
coefficient of determination (Table 5) indicates that there is no significant relationship between the 
bank variables examined in equation (4) and NPLs. The rapid increase in NPLs in 1998 was caused 
by a large devaluation of rupiah and deterioration in the economy. The upper table in Table 5 
supports this position. A lower rupiah value increases NPL ratio and positive growth of GDP 
decreases NPL ratio. 
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VI. Conclusion  
The banking system in developing countries is more likely to be inefficient and information 
problem is severe. Related lending can be seen in many such economies. This article used the panel 
data of 74 commercial banks to examine the effects of related lending on bank performance in 
Indonesia, and the changes in these effects in the course of banking sector restructuring. The 
observation period from 1994 to 2007 was divided into four periods.  
The increase in related lending in the second period implies that banks were obliged to extend 
credit to related parties during Indonesia’s economic turmoil, and its negative effect on ROA and 
NIM indicates that banks transferred profits to related parties. This supports the looting view. By 
contrast, regression results before and after the crisis (period I and III) show the opposite evidence 
that a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. This fact supports the information 
view to compensate for the lack of information on borrowers. Concerning risk, the results did not 
confirm the effects of related lending on bank risk. 
 The observation period of this study encompassed the major macro shock of the Asian 
currency crisis. Thus along with the effects of related lending, it was also possible to examine the 
effects of banking sector restructuring on banking performance and changes in related lending. The 
estimations of ROA in the first period were not enough to explain the effects of related lending on 
bank performance. The specification of models was the same in all period, thus the insufficient 
results for the first period can be attributed to inadequate information disclosure under the old 
banking system before the crisis. The explanatory variables were able to explain profitability more 
effectively in the third and fourth period which implies indirectly that Indonesia’s information 
disclosure system has improved and the profit structure of banks has changed. 
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i Heretofore one of the functions of Bank Indonesia was providing credit to these sectors. 
ii For example, banks are prohibited from extending funds to related parties in contravention of the 
generally applicable procedures for the provision of funds. Banks are prohibited from purchasing 
low quality assets from related parties. 
iii NIM is calculated based on total interest income minus total interest expense divided by productive 
assets.   
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Table 1 DescriptiveSstatistics
Period Sample size ROA NIM Equity Ratio BOPO Asset (Millionof Rupiah)
Related lending
Ratio Credit Ratio
I 455 0.011 0.045 0.132 0.900 2,196,296 0.063 0.674
0.015 0.023 0.088 0.160 8,504,214 0.119 0.168
II 324 -0.035 0.039 0.105 1.010 7,471,713 0.043 0.502
0.149 0.075 0.207 0.402 26,700,000 0.093 0.255
III 216 0.009 0.059 0.117 0.930 12,600,000 0.026 0.493
0.025 0.049 0.084 0.193 36,900,000 0.051 0.205
IV 288 0.007 0.067 0.138 0.921 17,400,000 0.028 0.570
0.044 0.035 0.115 0.404 44,900,000 0.059 0.180
Total -0.002 0.051 0.124 0.938 8,680,174 0.044 0.577
0.081 0.049 0.134 0.308 30,400,000 0.093 0.216
Upper: average
Lower: standared deviation
Table 2 Return on Assets (ROA) Panel Regression (Fixed Effects)
Dependent Variable is ROA
Perioad roa Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
I equityr 0.035 0.020 * 0.033 0.019 * 0.042 0.019 **
1994-1996 bopo 0.036 0.005 *** 0.035 0.005 *** 0.035 0.005 ***
lnassets -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002
creditratio -0.015 0.007 ** -0.015 0.007 ** -0.014 0.007 **
related 0.005 0.007
LLL-med 0.001 0.002
LLL-ave 0.006 0.002 ***
Number of obs = 455 455 455
R2 (overall)= 0.042 0.042 0.050
F(5,297) 12.87 12.75 14.74
 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
II equityr 0.529 0.039 *** 0.539 0.038 *** 0.531 0.039 ***
1997-2000 bopo -0.074 0.017 *** -0.079 0.017 *** -0.077 0.017 ***
lnassets 0.035 0.017 ** 0.031 0.018 * 0.031 0.017 *
creditratio -0.124 0.032 *** -0.134 0.033 *** -0.134 0.033 ***
related -0.128 0.077 *
LLL-med -0.021 0.015
LLL-ave -0.028 0.018
Number of obs = 324 324 324
R2 (overall)= 0.575 0.595 0.593
F(5,211) 77.84 77.42 77.58
 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
III equityr 0.196 0.045 *** 0.208 0.046 *** 0.180 0.046 ***
2001-2003 bopo -0.085 0.010 *** -0.083 0.010 *** -0.086 0.010 ***
lnassets 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.007
creditratio -0.029 0.017 * -0.033 0.017 ** -0.027 0.017
related 0.091 0.043 **
LLL-med 0.002 0.004
LLL-ave 0.011 0.005 **
Number of obs = 216 216 216
R2 (overall)= 0.509 0.503 0.521
F(5,427) 28.33 26.65 28.83
 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
IV equityr 0.066 0.013 *** 0.066 0.013 *** 0.063 0.013 ***
2004-2007 bopo -0.122 0.003 *** -0.122 0.003 *** -0.121 0.003 ***
lnassets 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
creditratio -0.027 0.008 *** -0.027 0.008 *** -0.028 0.008 ***
related -0.013 0.031
LLL-med -0.001 0.002
LLL-ave -0.007 0.003 **
Number of obs = 288 288 288
R2 (overall)= 0.900 0.900 0.901
 F(5,211) 587.41 587.85 599.54
 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Related Lending rati Median Average
I 0.018 0.063
II 0.013 0.043
III 0.008 0.026
IV 0.007 0.028
Table 3  Net Interest Margin(NIM) Panel Regression 
Dependent Variable is NIM
I nim Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Fixed Effects equityr 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021
bopo -0.069 0.005 *** -0.069 0.005 *** -0.069 0.005 ***
lnassets -0.011 0.002 *** -0.011 0.002 *** -0.011 0.002 ***
creditratio 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007
related -0.001 0.007
LLL-med 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
LLL-ave
Number of obs = 455 455 455
R2 (overall)= 0.284 0.285 0.286
 F(5,297)= 49.20 49.19 49.19
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
II nim Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Random Effects
equityr 0.158 0.018 *** 0.164 0.018 *** 0.161 0.018 ***
bopo -0.067 0.008 *** -0.069 0.008 *** -0.068 0.008 ***
lnassets -0.003 0.002 * -0.003 0.002 * -0.003 0.002 **
creditratio -0.007 0.012 -0.008 0.012 -0.009 0.012
related -0.075 0.032 **
LLL-med -0.007 0.006
LLL-ave -0.016 0.007 **
Number of obs = 324 324 324
R2 (overall)= 0.515 0.509 0.514
 Wald chi2(5)= 337.39 329.23 335.96
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
III nim Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Random Effects equityr 0.140 0.052 *** 0.143 0.052 *** 0.151 0.052 ***
bopo -0.044 0.018 ** -0.043 0.018 ** -0.041 0.018 **
lnassets -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002
creditratio 0.051 0.018 *** 0.054 0.018 *** 0.049 0.018 ***
related -0.095 0.066
LLL-med 0.000 0.007
LLL-ave -0.012 0.008
Number of obs = 216 216 216
R2 (overall)= 0.231 0.225 0.231
 Wald chi2(5) = 43.75 41.52 43.72
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
IV nim Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Fixed Effects equityr 0.013 0.026 0.012 0.026 0.015 0.026
bopo -0.031 0.006 *** -0.031 0.006 *** -0.032 0.006 ***
lnassets -0.019 0.005 *** -0.019 0.005 *** -0.018 0.005 ***
creditratio 0.081 0.016 *** 0.079 0.016 *** 0.081 0.016 ***
related 0.015 0.061
LLL-med -0.005 0.004
LLL-ave 0.006 0.006
Number of obs = 288 288 288
R2 (overall)= 0.166 0.173 0.166
 F(5,211) = 9.97 10.27 10.16
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Tabel 4 Z‐score Panel Regression (Random Effects)
Dependent variable ＝Z‐score
(1) Explanatory variables are the average in the sub‐period.
z Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
equityr‐ave 332.43 83.22 *** 331.04 83.31 *** 332.40 83.16 ***
bopo‐ave ‐111.25 36.73 *** ‐110.95 36.74 *** ‐110.46 36.70 ***
nim‐ave ‐871.31 270.83 *** ‐840.54 268.44 *** ‐864.69 268.58 ***
credito‐ave 15.65 45.21 17.34 45.49 15.18 45.15
exchng‐ave ‐44.52 230.22 ‐38.81 229.67 ‐32.53 230.16
gdp_g‐ave 1442.63 232.06 *** 1427.64 231.06 *** 1434.93 230.96 ***
    related ‐44.70 95.97
    LLL‐med 3.74 13.69
    LLL‐ave ‐7.92 15.52
Number of obs = 359
R2 (overall) 0.2327 0.2329 0.2327
Wald chi2(7)   118.95 118.84 118.74
 Prob > chi2  0 0
(2) Explanatory variables are the last year data of the sub‐period.
z Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
equityr 339.57 72.84 *** 339.09 73.26 *** 340.08 72.78 ***
bopo ‐73.01 34.13 ** ‐72.90 34.15 ** ‐73.14 34.12 **
nim ‐372.23 169.95 ** ‐377.00 169.32 ** ‐385.52 169.62 **
creditratio 104.51 39.44 *** 104.98 39.55 *** 104.25 39.35 ***
exchng 668.74 169.97 *** 665.95 169.85 *** 668.99 170.11 ***
gdp_g 690.08 215.97 *** 694.19 215.71 *** 691.07 216.00 ***
    related 19.18 74.67
    LLL‐med 0.72 13.69
    LLL‐ave ‐7.46 16.87
Number of obs = 357 357
R2 (overall) 0.2078 0.2076 0.2075
Wald chi2(7) 100.85 100.67 100.72
 Prob > chi2  0
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Tabel 5 Non perfoming loan ratio Panel Regression (Random Effects)
Dependent variable ＝NPL
All(II-IV) npl Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Random Effect equityr -0.147 0.179 -0.134 0.177 -0.168 0.177
lnassets -0.017 0.013 -0.015 0.013 -0.020 0.013
creditratio -0.121 0.122 -0.108 0.122 -0.138 0.122
exchng 0.883 0.397 ** 0.887 0.397 ** 0.881 0.397 **
gdp g -1.479 0.602 ** -1.477 0.600 ** -1.469 0.600 **
related -0.075 0.318
LLL-med 0.043 0.049
LLL-ave -0.087 0.060
Number of obs = 718 718 718
R2 (overall)= 0.104 0.1049 0.1061
 Wald chi2(5) 83.82 84.63 86.14
Prob > chi2 0
II npl Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Random Effect equityr -0.227 0.445 -0.199 0.440 -0.275 0.445
lnassets -0.053 0.046 -0.053 0.046 -0.058 0.047
creditratio -0.166 0.405 -0.095 0.408 -0.209 0.404
exchng 0.718 0.881 0.728 0.884 0.750 0.880
gdp g -1.470 1.415 -1.408 1.421 -1.457 1.412
related -0.147 0.733
LLL-med 0.169 0.161
LLL-ave -0.186 0.190
Number of obs = 214 214 214
R2 (overall)= 0.0702 0.0757 0.0744
 Wald chi2(5) 16.07 17.11 17.07
Prob > chi2 0.0134 0.0089 0.009
III npl Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Random Effect equityr -0.085 0.141 -0.086 0.141 -0.085 0.141
lnassets 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006
creditratio -0.042 0.055 -0.045 0.056 -0.043 0.056
exchng 1.618 1.299 1.606 1.300 1.615 1.300
gdp g 2.760 2.794 2.740 2.797 2.757 2.795
related 0.004 0.190
LLL-med -0.006 0.019
LLL-ave -0.001 0.023
Number of obs = 216 216 216
R2 (overall)= 0.0321 0.0338 0.0321
 Wald chi2(5) 8.42 8.5 8.42
Prob > chi2 0.209 0.2036 0.2089
IV npl Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Fixed Effect equityr 0.023 0.060 0.026 0.059 0.027 0.061
lnassets -0.040 0.012 *** -0.038 0.012 *** -0.040 0.012 ***
creditratio -0.003 0.038 0.002 0.037 -0.003 0.038
exchng -0.264 0.345 -0.158 0.342 -0.249 0.346
gdp g 0.181 0.199 0.121 0.197 0.176 0.199
related 0.026 0.150
LLL-med 0.026 0.010 **
LLL-ave 0.007 0.015
Number of obs = 288 288 288
R2 (overall)= 0.0233 0.0207 0.0237
 F(6,210) 2.65 3.86 2.68
 Prob > F  0.0168 0.0011 0.0157
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
